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The child care tax credit (CCTC) is the largest federal government program in 
the United States aimed at helping families with child care expenses.l In 1991, 
over 5.9 million households took the CCTC, costing the government $2.8 bil- 
lion in tax revenues (Internal Revenue Service 1993). This paper measures 
the distributional effects of  the CCTC and dependent care assistance plans 
(DCAPs), an alternative tax-relief program administered as an employee bene- 
fit that allows families to pay for child care with pretax income. 
The tax credit’s critics claim that it is regressive because it benefits middle- 
and upper-income families without offering relief to less-advantaged  families.* 
Yet, previous research by  Dunbar and Nordhauser (1991) and Altshuler and 
Schwartz (1996) using tax return data shows that the tax credit is progressive. 
As  with any government program targeted at child care, this tax relief will 
redistribute resources from households without children to households with 
children. However, as discussed by Altshuler and Schwartz, much of this redis- 
tribution cancels out over the life cycle: families with young children may re- 
ceive tax relief now but will not receive relief when their children are older. 
Since this type of redistribution is transitory, we focus on measuring the redis- 
tribution of benefits within the population of families with children. This redis- 
tribution comes from the various tax rules pertaining to tax relief for child 
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care, how child care expenditures vary with income, and differences in family 
choices regarding child care. 
Our primary data source is the National Child Care Survey (NCCS), al- 
though when  possible we  compare our results with those obtained using  a 
sample of tax returns. The NCCS surveys families with at least one child under 
age 13 and thus isolates a cohort of families with children of eligible ages for 
tax relief. In addition, the NCCS includes information that is not available from 
the previously analyzed tax return data. For example, it has information on 
access and participation in DCAPs and details on family structure, labor force 
participation, and child care expenses. This information allows us to investi- 
gate what family characteristics affect whether a family receives tax relief and, 
if  so, how  much tax relief it receives. We  can also construct an  alternative 
ability-to-pay measure, “potential labor income,” based on wage and individual 
characteristic data. The advantage of this alternative measure of  ability to pay 
is that it is related to a family’s labor market opportunities rather than its prefer- 
ences for leisure. 
Our results suggest that a broad cross section of Americans benefit from tax 
relief for child care. However, tax relief does not reach the bottom 10 percent 
of the income distribution primarily because the CCTC is nonrefundable. De- 
spite this regressivity at low  income levels, we  find that  above the bottom 
quintile of the income distribution, tax relief is progressive: the effective sub- 
sidy rate (i.e., tax relief benefits divided by  income) steadily declines with 
income. We attribute this progressivity to a combination of progressive features 
of the tax rules (e.g., the CCTC rate declines with income) and the income 
inelasticity of child care expenses. Finally, we find tax relief to be more pro- 
gressive when we use potential income as a measure of ability to pay. 
Among families that receive tax relief for child care expenses, the tax bene- 
fits average 1.24 percent of family income. While our results on the progressi- 
vity of tax relief indicate that this percentage varies systematically across in- 
come groups, tax  relief  is  too  small to  influence  the  income distribution 
dramatically. However, tax relief also varies substantially across families with 
the same income. This variation within income groups suggests that tax relief 
for child care changes household tax liabilities (and after-tax incomes), de- 
pending on the ages and number of children in the family, marital status of the 
parents, parent’s education, and choice of child care arrangements. 
Our results using potential income suggest that household labor supply deci- 
sions are an integral part of  how tax relief for child care is distributed. By 
reducing the after-tax price of child care, tax relief for child care can affect the 
labor market and child care decisions of households. In response to the lower 
price of child care, families may choose paid care over nonpaid care, a different 
mode of  market-provided care  (e.g.,  child care center vs.  family day  care 
home), or a higher-priced option within a particular mode of child care. Reduc- 
ing the cost of child care may also affect the labor force participation or hours 
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wage. To the extent that tax relief induces significant changes in household 
labor supply and child care decisions, these behavioral responses will have 
implications for the distributional effects of any changes in the tax treatment 
of child care. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.1 briefly de- 
scribes the different features of tax relief. Section 4.2 discusses various ratio- 
nales for tax relief for child care. Section 4.3 presents evidence on the prog- 
ressivity of tax relief, providing a comparison of results from the NCCS and 
tax return data. Section 4.4 explores the determinants of the distribution of tax 
relief, including the various rules pertaining to tax relief for child care, how 
child care expenditures vary with income, and differences in family choices 
regarding child care. Section 4.5 discusses the results of using potential income 
to measure ability to pay. Section 4.6 discusses the implications of recent esti- 
mates of the demand for child care for how tax relief for child care can affect 
family behavior. The last section summarizes our results. 
4.1  Tax Relief for Child Care 
The U.S.  income tax code has had special provisions for child care expenses 
since 1954.3  Initially, work-related child care expenses incurred by low-income 
families were deductible from the tax base. In  1971, Congress expanded de- 
ductibility to cover a broader range of income groups, allowing families with 
an adjusted gross income (AGI) up to $27,600 to receive benefits. The Tax 
Reform Act of  1976 replaced the deductibility of expenses with a flat 20 per- 
cent credit for work-related child care expenses. The Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of  1981 (ERTA) modified the credit by introducing the current declining 
rate credit. ERTA also introduced DCAPs, which are employer-provided bene- 
fits that effectively give some taxpayers the choice between claiming the CCTC 
and deducting child care expenses from their taxable income. Subsequent tax 
reforms have made minor changes to the tax relief provisions, but they are 
substantially the same as enacted in 1981. Below, we describe current features 
of the tax treatment of child care expenses. 
In terms of eligibility, the two tax relief programs, the CCTC and DCAPs, 
are similar and have  several features in common: (1) Only the expenses for 
children under age 13 qualify. (2) Both parents, or the single parent, must work 
or be enrolled in school. (3) Child care expenses must be work related. (4) 
Eligible expenses are limited to the earned income of  the parent with the 
least income. 
The programs differ in the amount of  eligible expenses, the value of  the 
reduction in taxes, and in their administration. For the CCTC, qualified ex- 
penses are limited to $2,400 for families with one child under age 13 and 
3. Wolfman (1984) discusses the legislative history of child care provisions in the tax code and 
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$4,800 for families with more than one child under age 13. The amount of the 
credit depends on family income and child care expenses. For families with 
AGI below $10,000, the credit is 30 percent of qualified expenses. The rate of 
the credit falls by  1  percentage point for every $2,000 of AGI until AGI equals 
$28,000. For families with AGI above $28,000, the credit rate is 20 percent. 
The credit is nonrefundable so the total credit is limited to the family’s tax lia- 
bility. 
In contrast to the CCTC, DCAPs are flexible spending accounts by  which 
employees can reduce their pretax income and use the reduction to pay  for 
child care expenses. Employees cannot unilaterally create DCAPs; instead, 
employers must offer the plans as part of a fringe benefit package. Total family 
contributions to DCAPs are limited to $5,000. Contributions are subject to 
neither income nor payroll taxes. The employee chooses a contribution level at 
the beginning of the year and contributions are subject to a “use it or lose it” 
rule: the employee loses any contributions that are not withdrawn for child care 
expenses during the year. Since DCAP contributions lower taxable income, the 
DCAP’s value roughly equals the family’s marginal tax rate times the DCAP 
contribution. 
A dollar of child care expenses cannot be subsidized through both the CCTC 
and the DCAP. However, using a DCAP does not completely preclude using 
the CCTC: each dollar contributed to a DCAP lowers the maximum expense 
qualifying for the CCTC by  a dollar. Whether a family benefits more from a 
DCAP or the CCTC depends on its credit rate and its marginal tax rate. Be- 
cause higher income families have lower credit rates and higher marginal rates, 
they may find it advantageous to use the DCAP rather than the CCTC. Conse- 
quently, the distribution of  tax relief for child care is likely to be even more 
skewed toward middle- and upper-income families than the distribution of the 
benefits of the CCTC alone. 
4.2  Rationales for the Tax Treatment of Child Care 
In discussing the appropriate tax treatment of  different items under an in- 
come tax, economists often start from the Haig-Simons definition of  income: 
income is the monetary value of increases in potential consumption net of the 
costs incurred to earn that income. Under this definition, one could argue that 
work-related  child care expenses should be  tax  deductible. Yet,  the  Haig- 
Simons criterion is not so easily applied in this case. For example, from the 
standpoint of  a family with children in which both parents work, child care 
may be considered a necessary business expense. However, from the stand- 
point of a family deciding whether to have children, the future costs of child- 
rearing, including work-related child care, are arguably more a personal con- 
sumption decision than a necessary business expense. Despite the ambiguity 
under the Haig-Simons criterion, it is interesting to note that this argument for 
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A broad range of other arguments can be made for and against tax provisions 
for child care. We  divide these normative rationales into two groups: equity 
and efficiency (or incentive) arguments. 
4.2.1 
One goal of  income taxation is to levy taxes in relation to a household’s 
ability to pay. Yet, annual income is not necessarily a good measure of ability 
to pay. For example, a two-parent family with both parents in the labor force 
could have the same inherent ability to pay  as a two-parent family with only 
one parent in the labor force, but its measured income would be different be- 
cause of its labor supply choices. By giving the two-earner family tax relief 
for their child care expenses, the tax system makes a crude adjustment for this 
discrepancy between measured and actual ability to pay. A major flaw in this 
argument is that targeting child care is an imprecise way of distinguishing be- 
tween one-earner and two-earner families because many two-earner families 
do not have child care expenses. A more precise adjustment would be a partial 
deduction of the earnings of the secondary earner as was the case in the United 
States in the early 1980s (see Feldstein and Feenberg, chap. 2 in this volume). 
Another possible justification for tax relief for child care is that differences 
in child care expenses drive a wedge between otherwise similar families. For 
example, the income tax code already recognizes that ability to pay can depend 
on family size by allowing personal exemptions. However, a uniform personal 
exemption does not distinguish between families with different costs of raising 
children, for example, if  younger children are more expensive to raise than 
older school-aged children. Yet, this is more of  an argument for making the 
personal exemption related to age than for special treatment for child care ex- 
pense~.~  Another example would be that some families have access to low- 
cost, high-quality child care (e.g., care provided by a relative) while otherwise 
similar families do not have access to such care (see Krashinsky 1981).  In this 
case, tax relief for child care adjusts tax payments to reflect differences in 
ability to pay driven by variation in the costs of care. Both of these arguments 
(distinguishing between two-earner and one-eamer families and families with 
different child care expenses) are horizontal equity arguments for tax relief for 
child care. 
In contrast to horizontal equity arguments, the notion of vertical equity is 
implicit in claims by critics of the CCTC that most of the benefits of tax relief 
accrue to middle- and upper-income fa mi lie^.^ These critics are often most 
Equity and the Tax Treatment of Child Care 
4. One obvious difference between making the personal exemption related to age and tax relief 
for child care is that targeting child care increases the chance that part of the additional after-tax 
income is spent on children. This concern is analogous to the sentiment that some people are more 
willing to have  welfare for children than for parents.  Of course,  since money is fungible it is 
unclear whether this targeting changes overall expenditure patterns. 
5. See, e.g., the statement of Douglas J. Besharov before the Senate Finance Committee (US. 
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concerned with the quality of child care in low-income households. Thus, they 
compare the distribution of benefits generated by direct expenditure programs 
targeted at low-income families (e.g., Head Start) with the much less targeted 
tax relief programs. Vertical equity considerations have obviously affected the 
design of tax relief programs, including the declining credit rate and the limits 
on qualified expenditures. 
4.2.2  Efficiency and Tax Relief for Child Care 
In addition to horizontal and vertical equity rationales, tax relief for child 
care may be justified on efficiency (or incentive) grounds. One of the often- 
cited goals of subsidizing child care (whether through the tax system or direct 
expenditure programs) is to improve the quality of care received, particularly 
by children in low-income families. Society may care about the quality of care 
received by children in low-income families for equity reasons  or because 
quality care generates social benefits, just as we believe education generates 
benefits beyond the individual. If these external benefits are large, which may 
be especially likely for children from disadvantaged families, then subsidizing 
child care may increase efficiency. Tax relief for child care reduces the mar- 
ginal cost of care for many working families? which may encourage families 
to spend more per hour of care or to purchase more hours of care (if the child 
does not already have paid care for all of the parents’ working hours). Higher- 
cost care is commonly presumed  to be  of  higher  quality. Also, if  market- 
provided care is of higher quality than the alternative form of care (e.g., self- 
care), then increasing the number of hours of paid care (for a given number of 
hours of parents’ labor supply) increases the quality of care received. 
Another often-cited goal of  subsidizing child care is to influence the labor 
force participation  and hours-of-work  decisions of  parents. A common as- 
sumption is that parents’ labor supply decisions depend on the net-of-tax wage 
after accounting for child care expenses (the effective wage rate). Tax relief 
that is tied to labor force participation, under certain assumptions, increases 
the effective wage rate of the recipient (often the mother).’ Thus, tax relief is 
likely to influence the mother’s labor force participation decision as well as her 
decision regarding how many hours to work. Changes in labor supply could 
affect efficiency in two ways8  First, as is sometimes argued in the policy de- 
6. For families that do not have tax liabilities or exceed the qualified expense limits, tax relief 
does not affect the marginal cost of child care. 
7. In  particular, it is necessary to assume that for every hour worked, an hour of child care 
is needed. 
8. For a more detailed efficiency argument, see Krashinsky (1981), which presents a model with 
household production of child care and adult consumption. In the presence of  a wage tax, the 
deductibility  of  child care expenses  is  the largest  subsidy that can be justified  on efficiency 
grounds. The optimal child care subsidy rate relative to the marginal wage tax rate depends on the 
relative elasticities between goods for time in the production of child care and adult consumption. 
He argues that reasonable assumptions about the substitutability of time and goods for producing 
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bate, if  the tax treatment of child care induces low-income parents to work, 
then these parents may learn work skills that lead them to self-sufficiency. Sec- 
ond, for higher-income families, the tax treatment of child care could mitigate 
some of the inefficiencies created by the current tax treatment of two-income 
families (see Feldstein and Feenberg, chap. 2 in this volume, for details on 
possible efficiency gains of alternative tax rules for families). 
4.3  Distribution of Tax Relief for Child Care 
As discussed above, rationales for tax relief for child care include both verti- 
cal and horizontal equity arguments. The limited previous literature has fo- 
cused solely on vertical equity. In this section, we address the vertical equity 
of  tax relief for child care by  evaluating the progressivity of tax relief using 
new data and a somewhat different methodology. In the next section, to address 
some of  the horizontal equity concerns, we  examine the distribution of  tax 
relief for child care across family characteristics, such as marital status and the 
number of children. 
4.3.1  Measuring Progressivity 
Tax relief for child care has been criticized as regressive because it is pre- 
dominantly used by middle- and upper-income families (Robins 1990). Critics 
point to nonrefundability of the credit as a particularly regressive feature. Yet, 
other features of the CCTC, such as the credit rate declining with income, are 
progressive. Contrary to the claims of regressivity, using  1979-86  tax return 
data Dunbar and Nordhauser (1991) find that the tax system with the CCTC is 
more progressive than without the CCTC. 
Several methodological points may  help explain this controversy over the 
progressivity of the CCTC. First, instead of focusing on families with children, 
Dunbar and Nordhauser study all households. Therefore, part of the CCTC’s 
progressivity may simply be from the transfer of income from older families 
to families with children. This redistribution may increase the measured annual 
progressivity of the tax credit because older families are likely to have higher 
annual incomes than families with young children, for life-cycle reasons. How- 
ever, in the long run (assuming the tax credit stays in place), all families with 
children have an opportunity to qualify for the tax credit when their children 
are young. The effects of these transfers may be large since 6.5 percent of 1989 
tax returns claim the CCTC (Internal Revenue Service 1991-92)  compared 
with 29.9 percent of our sample of families with children. 
Altshuler and Schwartz (1996) also examine the progressivity of the CCTC 
using tax return data. Unlike Dunbar and Nordhauser, they use average income 
over a number of years as a way of removing some transitory income shocks. 
Even with this alternative measure of ability to pay, they find results similar to 
Dunbar and Nordhauser’s. Yet,  this approach still fails to capture life-cycle 
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by restricting their sample to tax returns with dependent children. The NCCS 
gives us better information on family characteristics for determining whether 
a family is eligible for tax relief. 
Second, Dunbar  and  Nordhauser  use  average measures  of  progressivity 
rather than estimating progressivity at different points in the income distribu- 
tion. The CCTC could, on average, be progressive while still being regressive 
for low income groups. To measure progressivity at different points in the in- 
come distribution, we focus on how the average effective subsidy rate varies 
with in~ome.~  The effective subsidy rate is the ratio of dollars of tax relief to 
household income. The average effective subsidy rate is the mean value of this 
ratio for the families in each income group. If the subsidy rate increases with 
income, then tax relief is regressive because higher income families are receiv- 
ing proportionately more benefits. This measure of tax relief progressivity is 
the analog to average rate progression commonly used in tax analysis. 
Finally, the progressivity of tax relief depends on the relationship between 
child care expenditures and income. If lower-income families spend a larger 
fraction of their incomes on child care than higher-income families, then, cet- 
eris paribus, a subsidy to child care will be progressive. Unfortunately, the 
all-else-equal  assumption fails to hold: labor force participation,  household 
income, and child care expenses are endogenously determined (see Connelly 
1992; Blau and Robins  1988). Therefore, income is a flawed ability-to-pay 
criterion for measuring progressivity.  lo 
As an alternative ability-to-pay criterion, we construct a measure of house- 
hold potential labor income. By eliminating differences in labor supply deci- 
sions from the ability-to-pay measure, our potential income measure assigns 
the same ability to pay to one-earner  and two-earner families that have the 
same labor market opportunities. For the one-earner family, the ratio of actual 
income to potential income is low relative to the two-earner family. However, 
the two-earner family is more likely to benefit from tax relief. By treating these 
two families as equal, using potential income as a measure of  ability to pay 
may reduce the perception that tax relief benefits are concentrated among rela- 
tively well off families. 
4.3.2  Distribution of Benefits: NCCS Data 
The NCCS includes 4,397 families with at least one child under age 13 (see 
Hofferth et al. 1991 for details on the NCCS). Along with demographic and 
labor market data, the NCCS has data on the families' child care arrangements. 
The survey, conducted from October 1989 to April  1990, asked whether the 
family planned to use the CCTC for 1989, whether either parent had access to 
9. Altshuler and Schwartz examine progressivity at different points in the income distribution 
10. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, chap. 9) discuss the logic of wanting to measure interpersonal 
and find that the CCTC is progressive on average but regressive at low income levels. 
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a DCAP, and if the family used the DCAP, the family's contribution level. We 
exclude families with missing information on (1) whether they plan to use the 
credit for  1989, (2) whether they paid for child care, (3) marital status, (4) 
employment status, (5)  household income, or (6) whether they use a DCAP 
(given that they have access to a DCAP). This leaves a sample of  3,526 fam- 
ilies. 
The NCCS data have a number of advantages over tax return data. First, the 
NCCS isolates a cohort of families with children of eligible ages for tax relief. 
Second, in addition to information on the CCTC, the NCCS has information 
on access and participation in DCAPs. Third, the NCCS includes details on 
family structure, labor force participation, and child care expenses. This de- 
tailed demographic, labor market, and expenditure data set allows us to sepa- 
rate eligible households from ineligible households. It also enables us to un- 
cover whether certain types of families benefit more from tax relief than others, 
and it allows us to examine how the income elasticity of  child care expendi- 
tures influences the distribution of benefits. A disadvantage of  the NCCS for 
studying tax relief is the need to impute tax liabilities and the value of  tax 
relief. 
Table 4.1 presents the take-up rates for each type of  tax relief by  income 
level. Since some families use both programs, the table also reports the take- 
up rate for families using either form of tax relief. For the overall sample, 29.9 
percent of  families claim the  CCTC but  only  1.6 percent of  families use 
DCAPs. Overall, 30.6 percent of families claim some form of tax relief. This 
percentage increases with income: 25.6 percent of families with incomes be- 
low $25,000 (about the bottom third of the income distribution) claim tax re- 
lief, compared with 30.0 percent of families with incomes between $25,000 
and $40,000 (roughly the middle third of  the income distribution), and 36.5 
percent of families with incomes about $40,000. Tax relief from DCAPs goes 
to an affluent minority: only 1.6 percent of  families use DCAPs but almost 
two-thirds (63.8 percent) of these families have incomes above $50,000. Since 
DCAPs are such a small fraction of total tax relief, the pattern of the take-up 
rates for the CCTC mirror the take-up rates for all tax relief. 
The main reason DCAPs are such a small fraction of  tax relief is that few 
families have  access to them. In our NCCS sample, only 7.7 percent of  the 
households  (272/3,526)  report  having  access  to  a  DCAP."  Data  from 
employer-based surveys suggest that more than 7.7 percent of  families had 
access to DCAPs in the late 1980s; Hayes, Palmer, and Zaslow (1990, 203) 
11. One problem with self-reported data is that some people may be unaware of  whether their 
employers offer DCAPs. We classify these families as not having access. In part, knowledge of 
access to DCAPs may be correlated with overall awareness of tax relief programs. In the NCCS 
data, families with access to DCAPs have a higher propensity  to use the CCTC than families 
without access. While 29.9 percent of all families take the CCTC, 60.3 percent (35/58)  of families 
that use DCAPs also plan to use the CCTC for 1989. For families with access to DCAF's  that do 
not contribute to the DCAP, 41.6 percent (89/214) use the CCTC. Table 4.1  Tax Relief by Income Level for 1989 
Cumulative  Percentage with  Mean Tax Relief for  Mean ESR for 
Percentage of  Percentage Taking  Percentage Using  Some Tax  Families with Tax  Families with Tax  Mean ESR for 
Income  Income Distribution  CCTC  DCAP  Relief  Relief ($)  Relief  All Families 
























































































































































Notes; The sample includes 3,526 families. The take-up rates in cols. (2t(4)  are from responses to questions on whether the family takes the CCTC or uses a DCAP. 
Cols. (5)  and (6) condition on whether a family claims to receive either form of tax relief and reports paying for some regular child care. ESR stands for the effective 
subsidy rate expressed as a percentage of income. Col. (7) is the ESR averaging over all families and assigning an ESR of zero to families that claim to use tax relief 
but do not report child care expenses. 109  Tax Treatment of Child Care 
report that  approximately 14 percent of  large and small employers offered 
DCAPs. More recent data indicate that access to DCAPs is growing rapidly; 
according to a survey by  Foster Higgins, benefits consultants, 45 percent of 
large employers offer DCAPs (reported in Rowland 1994). Access to DCAPs 
is skewed toward higher-income households. Relative to families in the bottom 
third of the income distribution, families in the top third of the income distribu- 
tion are almost four times more likely to report having access to a DCAP.’* 
Furthermore, since DCAPs are less valuable than the CCTC for lower-income 
households, the DCAP take-up rate among families with access to DCAPs 
rises sharply with income: 4.8 percent (2/42) of households in the bottom third 
of the income distribution (and no families with income below $20,000), 16.3 
percent (13/80) of the middle third, and 28.7 percent (43/150) of the top third 
use DCAPs. 
The overall pattern of take-up rates of tax relief reflects several differences 
between high- and low-income families. First, at very low incomes, the take- 
up rate is low for working families because they have zero tax liability. Second, 
low-income families are less likely to work and be eligible for tax relief. How- 
ever, conditional on all parents in the family working during the previous year, 
the differences in take-up rates persist (not shown in the table). Third, low- 
income working families are less likely to use paid child care and be eligible 
for tax relief. Conditioning on working and paying for child care, the take-up 
rates are similar across income groups: 50.5 percent of families in the bottom 
third of the income distribution claim tax relief, compared with 54.2 percent 
of families in the top third. Thus, differences in family choices regarding child 
care and labor force participation at least partially explain the distribution in 
benefits across families of different income levels. 
While the take-up rates increase with income, progressivity depends on the 
relationship of  dollars of  tax  relief  to income. Since the NCCS only asks 
whether a family takes the CCTC and not the value of  the credit, we must 
impute the value of tax relief. First, we calculate the family’s tax liability be- 
fore the CCTC. Since the CCTC is nonrefundable, this tax liability is an upper 
bound for the value of the tax credit. We  start by assuming that a family’s AGI 
is the midpoint of their reported income range. Next, we impute taxable in- 
come by assuming that the standard deduction is taken and basing the value of 
exemptions on the number of people in the household.13  The tax liability de- 
pends on taxable income and the rate schedule. 
12. For the bottom third of the income distribution, 3.4 percent (42/1,237) of households report 
having access to DCAPs, compared with 7.0 percent (80/1,147) of the families in the middle third, 
and 13.1 percent (150/1,142) of the families in the top third of the income distribution. 
13. The assumption that all families take the standard deduction is unlikely to affect the results 
because the CCTC subsidy rate is based on AGI, which is calculated before taking either itemized 
or standard deductions. In some cases, we may understate the effect of the credit being nonrefund- 
able since families with exceedingly high itemized deductions may not have taxable income to 
offset against the credit. Also, we may  overstate the marginal tax rates of  some families who 
itemize, which would overstate the value of their using a DCAP. 110  William M. Gentry and Alison P.  Hagy 
The value of the CCTC is the maximum of either the family’s tax liability 
before the CCTC or the product of the family’s credit rate and their qualifying 
annual expenses. The family’s credit rate depends on AGI. We assume that all 
reported child care expenses are work related and qualify for the  redi it.'^ For 
families using DCAPs, the value of the DCAP is the family’s marginal tax rate 
times their DCAP contribution. The total value of tax relief is the sum of the 
values of the CCTC and the DCAP after accounting for the provision that each 
dollar spent can receive only one form of relief. 
Column (5) of  table 4.1 reports the average dollar value of tax relief by 
income level for families claiming tax relief and reporting positive child care 
expenses during the last year.I5  The average value of all tax relief is $446 per 
recipient, while the average value of just the CCTC is $429 (not shown in the 
table). The dollar value of  tax relief is zero or quite small for families with 
incomes under $10,000, reflecting nonrefundability of the CCTC.16  The value 
of tax relief rises quickly over the first few income groups and then flattens out 
over a broad range of incomes. The decline in the value of the credit between 
$17,500  and $30,000 may be partly explained by the credit rate declining with 
income. In addition, part of the increase in the value of tax relief at the top of 
the income distribution most likely reflects the increasing propensity to use 
DCAPs, which are more valuable than the CCTC. We return to explanations 
for the observed distribution of benefits in the next section. 
Column (6) presents the mean effective subsidy rate (ESR) conditional on 
claiming tax relief. Overall, tax relief for child care is 1.24 percent of the in- 
come of those taking the credit. For the bottom quintile of the income distribu- 
tion, the subsidy rate increases with income suggesting that tax relief is indeed 
regressive. The ESR  reaches  a maximum  of  3.4 percent of  income for the 
$15,000-$17,500  income  group. Above this  income  level, the  mean  ESR 
steadily falls with income, suggesting that over most of the income distribution 
tax relief is progressive. 
While the ESR declines with income for families with tax relief (col. [6]), 
the propensity to receive tax relief increases with income (col. [4]). The prod- 
14. The NCCS allowed respondents to report child care expenditures over different intervals 
(e.g., weekly, monthly, or annually). Therefore, we calculate annual expenditures by multiplying 
weekly expenditures by 44 and monthly expenditures by  12. The choice of 44 weeks per year is 
somewhat arbitrary but reflects the fact that most families do not purchase work-related child care 
every week because of holidays and vacations. The choice of 12 months per year is also somewhat 
arbitrary. Nevertheless, it reflects our belief that expenditures reported on a monthly basis more 
accurately reflect days missed than expenditures reported on a weekly basis. As noted below, these 
assumptions lead to imputed tax credits that are similar to those found in tax return data. 
15. The numerator of the take-up rates includes all families claiming to use tax relief. However, 
some of these families reported having no paid child care during the previous year. We exclude 
these families from the calculations in cols. (5).  (6),  and (7) because we cannot impute the value 
of tax relief. 
16. A puzzle in the data is why so many families with low incomes report receiving tax relief 
when their incomes suggest that the CCTC has no value to them. One possible explanation is that 
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uct of these two columns (col. [7]) is the unconditional ESR and may be inter- 
preted as the mean ESR for all families.” As with column (6), the uncondi- 
tional ESR increases through the bottom quintile of  the income distribution 
and falls through the rest of the income distribution. Unlike the numbers in 
column (6), the unconditional ESR is roughly constant between incomes of 
$25,000 and $100,000, which suggests that tax relief is proportional to income 
through much of the income distribution. Therefore, even without conditioning 
on receiving tax relief, the tax programs are at least proportional over most of 
the income distribution of families with children. 
4.3.3 
In using the NCCS data to measure the distribution of tax relief, we must 
impute the value of  tax relief using self-reported information on income and 
expenditures. This imputation may differ from the actual tax situation of  the 
household because either income or child care expenses reported on tax returns 
differ from the survey responses. Since the quality of our data may affect our 
conclusions, we construct similar statistics to those presented in table 4.1 from 
tax return data for 1989. The tax return data are from the public-use sample 
prepared by  the Statistics of  Income (SOI) Division of the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS). In order to be as comparable to the NCCS data as possible, we 
use a sample of 39,459 tax returns of families with dependent children living 
at home. As discussed above, tax return data has the advantage of  precisely 
measuring the value of  the CCTC but has several disadvantages, such as not 
being able to isolate a cohort of families with children of eligible age for tax 
relief or measure tax relief from DCAPs. Therefore, our analysis of tax return 
data focuses entirely on the CCTC. 
Before comparing the distribution of  the CCTC in the two data sets, it is 
instructive to compare the NCCS responses with the aggregate number of fam- 
ilies taking the credit reported by the IRS. Using the entire NCCS sample and 
sample weights that correct for potential nonresponses, the NCCS data imply 
that 6.01 million families took the credit in  1988 and 7.09 million families 
planned to take the credit in 1989.18 In contrast, the SO1 tax return samples 
indicate that 8.82  million families took the credit in 1988 but only 5.92 million 
Distribution of Benefits: Tax Return Data 
17. The numbers in col. (7) are not exactly equal to the product of cols. (4) and (6)  since col. 
(6)  is conditional on the family reporting paid child care expenses. In col. (7), we treat families 
that claim to receive tax relief but report no paid child care expenses as having an ESR of zero. 
This assumption may lead to col. (7) understating the mean ESR for all families. 
18. We can offer two explanations for the 18 percent increase in claimants between 1988 and 
1989 in the NCCS. First, families whose only child was under age 1 at the time of the survey could 
not have qualified for the CCTC in 1988. This accounts for 430,000  claimants in 1989 but is offset 
by claimants eligible in 1988 but not surveyed by the NCCS (e.g., families with a youngest child 
who was  13  years old in  1988). This offset is probably small because  families with youngest 
children aged 13 rarely take the credit. Second, we expect that some respondents who did not 
know about the CCTC at the time of the survey said that they did not take it in the past but would 
take it in the future; that is, the NCCS raised these families’ awareness of the CCTC. 112  William M. Gentry and Alison P.  Hagy 
families did in 1989. The dramatic 33 percent decline in CCTC filers in the 
tax return data is most likely a response to changes in the tax rules that took 
effect in 1989 (e.g., claimants were required to report the social security num- 
ber of the child care pr~vider).'~  In contrast, tax credit benefits grew steadily 
at an average 19 percent nominal growth rate between 1980 and 1988, and the 
number of claimants grew by about 10  percent per year according to data from 
the IRS Statistics oflncome.  Also there is no evidence of any significant change 
in actual child care arrangements at this time. The proportion of children cared 
for either by a parent or by a relative stayed about the same between 1985 and 
1990 (Hofferth et al. 1991, 101). Thus, the decline in CCTC filers likely re- 
flects reduced  tax  evasion. That the  NCCS coincides with these legislated 
changes complicates comparisons of the two data sets. Nevertheless, averaging 
across  the  two  years,  the  two  data  sets  produce  similar  numbers  of  total 
claimants. 
Table 4.2 reports  statistics on the distribution  of  the CCTC from the tax 
return data.*O For the sake of  comparison, table 4.2 reports the same income 
ranges as in table 4.1; however, here we use each family's reported AGI as 
their household income rather than the midpoint of their income range as was 
necessary in table 4.1. In addition, since the tax return data do not precisely 
identify children's ages, the take-up rates in table 4.2 use all tax returns with 
dependent children living at home as the denominator. 
Despite the differences in the definition of the take-up rate, the take-up rates 
in the two samples have a similar pattern. It generally increases with income 
but declines slightly for households with incomes over $100,000. In addition, 
the average value of the CCTC is quite similar in the two data sets, though the 
value of  the credit is slightly lower in the tax return data than in the NCCS 
data ($404 vs. $429 per recipient). As with the NCCS data, the tax return data 
indicate that the dollar value of tax relief is zero or quite small for low-income 
families and that the benefits rise quickly before flattening out over a broad 
range of incomes. As a percentage of income, the CCTC rises through incomes 
of  $15,000 and falls fairly steadily for the rest of  the income distribution. 
While the mean ESR peaks at a lower income in the tax return data, this in- 
come level represents  a larger fraction of  the population than it does in the 
NCCS data. Thus, the general conclusion that tax relief is regressive at low 
income levels and progressive for most of the income distribution holds using 
tax return data, as well as with the NCCS data. 
Despite these similarities, there are some notable differences between the 
two data sets. Unlike the NCCS data, the tax return data do not show a positive 
19. The NCCS may not reflect this decline because at the time of the survey the respondents 
had not yet filed their 1989 tax returns, which would require the information reporting. Also, in 
responding to the NCCS, families that fraudulently claimed the CCTC might not say that they 
claimed it on their tax returns. 
20. Since the sample oversamples high-income tax returns, we use sampling weights to create 
statistics that are representative of  the overall population. Table 4.2  CCTC by Income Level for 1989, Tax Return Data 
Cumulative 
Percentage of 
(returns with  CCTC (returns  Families Taking  Families  Percentage for Which  Percentage for Which  Percentage for Which 
Income  dependents)  with dependents)  CCTC ($)  Taking CCTC  Refundahility Binds  Expense Limit Binds  Earnings Limit Binds 
Income Distribution  Percentage Taking  Mean CCTC for  Mean ESR for 


















































































































































Notes: The sample includes 39,459 tax returns from the public-use sample prepared by the SO1 Division of the IRS with dependent children living at home. Income 
ranges refer to AGI. The take-up rates in col. (2) use all tax returns as the denominator. Cols. (3) and (4) condition on whether a family receives a CCTC. 114  William M. Gentry and Alison P.  Hagy 
take-up rate at low income levels. This suggests that either the low-income 
families who claim to receive tax relief in the NCCS answered the tax relief 
question incorrectly or their AGI exceeds what they reported in the NCCS. At 
high income levels, the imputations using the NCCS overstate the value of tax 
relief relative to the tax return data.2' Also, in the various income ranges, the 
mean dollars received can vary substantially between the two data sets. These 
differences are most noticeable at the tails of the income distribution, where 
some of the sample sizes are quite 
4.4  Determinants of the Distribution of Tax Relief 
Several factors combine to generate the pattern of  benefits from tax relief 
described above. These factors include the various rules pertaining to tax relief 
for child care, how child care expenditures vary with income, and differences 
in family choices regarding child care. In this section, we explore each of these 
determinants of the distribution of benefits from tax relief for child care. 
4.4.1  Program Features 
In  addition to the declining credit rate, these features of  tax relief affect 
the distribution of benefits: (1) nonrefundability, (2)  limits on the maximum 
qualified expense, and (3) the earnings test that limits qualified expenses to the 
earnings of the parent with the lowest earnings. We examine the first and sec- 
ond of these features with both the NCCS and tax return data; for the earnings 
test, we use only the tax return data because the earnings data in the NCCS is 
subject to relatively large measurement error. 
Nonrefundability restricts the CCTC's benefits to low-income families with 
positive tax liabilities. As a consequence, it is difficult to measure how nonre- 
fundability affects the take-up rate. Changing the tax rules may induce several 
types of  behavioral responses, such as more parents working, more children 
being cared for by paid child care providers, and more families filing tax re- 
turns. These behavioral responses may be especially important for families that 
do not have a positive tax liability. We do not impute any behavioral changes. 
Instead, we calculate the fraction of families that have a positive tax liability 
before the CCTC but do not owe taxes after the credit. For  these families. 
21. A small portion of this difference is from including DCAPs in our measure of tax relief in 
table 4.2. Since the number of families using both a DCAP and the CCTC is small, the NCCS 
imputations for just the CCTC are typically similar to the imputations for all tax relief. However, 
for the $l25,000-$150,000  income range, the NCCS data suggest a mean value of all tax relief of 
$633 for families taking tax relief but a mean value of the CCTC of $256 for families taking the 
CCTC. This difference highlights the importance of examining both programs simultaneously. 
22. To test whether these differences are statistically significant, we compare the sample of 
CCTC observations in the two samples with a Mann-Whitney rank sum test for each income range. 
The null hypothesis of this nonparametric test is that the two samples are drawn from the same 
distribution. We reject this null hypothesis at the 95 percent confidence level in 8 of the 18 income 
ranges: $7,500-$10,000,  $15,000-$17,500,  and all of the ranges between $30,000-$100,000.  In 
these higher-income groups, our imputations from the NCCS overstate the value of the credit, 
which would tend to bias the results toward finding the credit to be regressive. 115  Tax Treatment of Child Care 
nonrefundability binds at the margin. Using the NCCS data, we estimate that 
half of the families with incomes below $17,500 with positive tax liabilities 
before the CCTC paid no taxes after the CCTC. Thus, nonrefundability pro- 
motes regressivity at low incomes. The tax return data, in column (5)  of table 
4.2, suggest that nonrefundability binds less frequently: 29.5 percent of  fami- 
lies with incomes below $17,500 who take the CCTC have a credit that is at 
least as large as their tax liability before the 
Qualified expense limits place an upper limit on the amount of tax relief a 
family can receive.24  Since higher-income families typically spend more on 
child care, one would expect these limits to have a greater impact on higher- 
income families. Using the NCCS data, we estimate that the expense limits 
bind for 29.1 percent of  all families. The fraction of  families for whom the 
limits bind increases substantially with income: for families in the bottom third 
of the income distribution, we estimate that the limits bind for 20.2 percent of 
families, compared to 35.9 percent of families in the top third of  the income 
distribution. By limiting the benefits of the relatively well-off, these expense 
limits increase the progressivity of tax relief. As reported in column (6) of table 
4.2, the tax return data confirm this result. Overall, the limit binds for 22.2 
percent of  all families, but it binds for 36.7 percent of  families with AGI 
above $100,000. 
The earnings test could affect the distribution of benefits if secondary earn- 
ers in certain income ranges tend to have lower earnings than secondary earn- 
ers in other income ranges. Column (7) of table 4.2 does not suggest a system- 
atic link between the earnings test binding and the level of  income. Overall, 
the earnings test binds for 2.1 percent of  families who take the CCTC. This 
limit binds most frequently for the bottom third of the income distribution and 
for the highest income groups. 
4.4.2  Income Elasticity 
The distribution of  tax  relief benefits for child care also depends on the 
income elasticity of expenditures. Subsidizing a good at a constant rate can be 
either progressive or regressive depending on whether the good is income in- 
elastic or elastic. As a simple measure of  the income elasticity of  child care 
purchases, we calculate how the median expenditure share varies with income. 
The median expenditure share for families with child care expenses falls from 
9.1 percent in the lowest third of the income distribution to 2.8 percent for the 
top third. While child care expenditures rise with income, this falling expendi- 
23. However, the $17,500  income cutoff represents 30 percent of the population in the tax return 
data, compared to only 20 percent of the NCCS sample. 
24. For families with only one child under age 13, the DCAP limit of $5,000 is considerably 
greater than the CCTC limit of $2,400. Of the 38 families that report their annual DCAP contribu- 
tions, 21 have only one eligible child. Of  these one-child families, two report contributions of 
$2,400 and eight report contributions greater than $2,400. Thus, for these families, the ability to 
use the DCAP for more expenses than the CCTC is an important difference between the two pro- 
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ture share suggests that child care expenses are income inelastic. Thus, it is not 
surprising that in the portion of the income distribution that faces a constant 
subsidy rate, we find that tax relief for child care is progressive. 
4.4.3  Family Characteristics 
While the tax code specifies the maximum value of tax relief, the actual tax 
benefit a family receives depends on certain family characteristics, such as the 
number of children, and on the family’s labor supply and child care choices. 
Many of these decisions are endogenous to government policies toward child 
care. We do not attempt to examine specific behavioral responses with respect 
to tax policy. Instead, in an effort to address horizontal equity concerns, our 
goal is simply to uncover whether certain types of families benefit more from 
tax relief than others. Therefore, in this section, we examine the distribution of 
tax relief for child care across family characteristics. 
A parent’s marital status is likely to have a strong influence on the house- 
hold’s labor supply and child care decisions. As a consequence, the benefits of 
tax relief  for child care are likely to vary according to marital status. Table 
4.3 presents the NCCS information from table 4.1 for single- and two-parent 
(married) families. Several differences emerge: First, the income distributions 
of the two types of households are dramatically different. Over half of single- 
parent families have incomes below $17,500, while over half of mamed house- 
holds have incomes over $35,000. Second, 38.4 percent of single parents report 
receiving tax relief, a substantially higher percentage than the 28.3 percent of 
married households that report receiving tax relief. This greater propensity to 
claim tax relief probably means that more single-parent households meet the 
work requirements than married couples. Third, the mean value of  tax relief 
for married families receiving relief exceeds that of single-parent families re- 
ceiving relief ($467 vs. $392). However, conditional on income, single-parent 
families typically receive more tax relief than two-parent families. This differ- 
ence is most prominent at low incomes, where differences in the value of ex- 
emptions for single heads of households and married families mean that single- 
parent  families have higher tax liabilities for any given level of  AGI. Also, 
married couples may rely less on market-provided child care than single par- 
ents because couples can share child care responsibilities. Finally, the mean 
ESR for single parents is 1.7 percent of  income, much larger than the mean 
ESR for married couples of  1.1 percent of income. The differences in take-up 
rates and ESRs suggest that tax relief for child care redistributes income from 
married households to single-parent households within the cohort of families 
with children.25 
As a way of characterizing the relationships between family characteristics 
and tax relief for child care, we regress whether a family claims tax relief and 
25. In terms of  progressivity  or regressivity within each sample, the two samples display the 
same peaked-shape pattern of ESRs as in the combined sample. Table 4.3  Tax Relief by Income Level for 1989, by Marital Status 
Single  Married 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
Mean Tax Relief  Cumulative 
for Families  Mean ESR for  Percentage 
Mean Tax Relief 
for Families  Mean ESR for 
of Income  Percentage with  with Tax  Families with  of Income  Percentage with  with Tax  Families with 
Income  Distribution  Some Tax Relief  Relief ($)  Tax  Relief  Distribution  Some Tax Relief  Relief ($)  Tax Relief 










































































































































































Notes: The sample includes 3,526 families of which 787 are single-parent families and 2,739 are two-parent families. The columns correspond to the columns in 
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the value of this tax relief (conditional on receiving tax relief) on various fam- 
ily characteristics. We include information on the age of the youngest child in 
the family, the number of children in each of four age groups (0-2  years old, 
3-5  years old, 6-1  2 years old, and 13-1 8 years old), the mother’s age and num- 
ber of years of schooling (for families with missing information on the mother, 
we use the father’s age and years of schooling), marital status, whether a rela- 
tive is available who could assist with child care, the primary child care ar- 
rangement of the youngest child in the family, and the logarithm of the mid- 
point of the family’s reported income range.26 
Column (1) of table 4.4 presents results from a probit regression of whether 
a family claims to receive tax relief. The results indicate that a family whose 
youngest child is older is less likely to receive tax relief. Thus, at a point in 
time, tax relief is associated with families with younger children. Families with 
more children tend to be less likely to receive tax relief (though this relation- 
ship is not statistically significant for children ages 3-5).  Conditional on in- 
come, more-educated mothers are more likely to receive tax relief, although 
this finding may reflect differences in labor force participation based on educa- 
tion levels.27  Consistent with the results in table 4.3, single-parent families are 
more likely to receive tax relief than two-parent families. Relative to families 
who report parental care as the primary arrangement of the youngest child (the 
omitted  category),  families  who  use  child  care centers  or family  day  care 
homes are the most likely to receive tax relief.2R 
Column (2) of table 4.4 reports the results from regressing the value of tax 
relief on family characteristics for families that claim tax relief. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the imputed value of tax relief for the family. The 
results indicate that families with more younger children receive more tax re- 
lief. For example, adding a four-year-old to a family that already receives tax 
relief will increase their tax relief by  26.2 percent. Again consistent with the 
results in table 4.3, two-parent families claiming tax relief receive lower bene- 
fits than single-parent families claiming tax relief. In addition, families using 
either child care centers or family day care homes as the primary arrangement 
for their youngest  child receive the largest benefits.29  The model excludes a 
26. Since the income variable is reported as a range, we include separate variables for each 
income group that are equal to the logarithm of the midpoint of the range for people reporting 
income in that range and zero for families reporting income outside of the range. 
27. The interpretation of this coefficient is complicated by  the fact that the family’s income 
depends on each parent’s labor force participation decision and education level. 
28. Since the primary arrangement variable applies only to each family’s youngest child but tax 
relief may result from expenditures on  older children, we tried two types of sensitivity analysis. 
First, we excluded the primary arrangement variables. Second, we used a sample of families with 
only one child, which required excluding the variables on the number of children in different age 
categories. For both of these alternative specifications, the remaining coefficients have a similar 
pattern to the reported results. 
29. As with the probit, we estimated two alternative specifications: (1) excluding the primary 
arrangement variables and (2) using families with only one child but excluding the age category 
variables. Again, these alternative specifications yield similar results to those reported in table 4.2. 119  Tax Treatment of Child Care 
Table 4.4  Regression Analysis of Take-up Rates and Value of Tax Relief 
Independent Variable 
Take-up Rate Probits 
(1) 
Youngest child’s age 
No. children age 0-2 
No. children age 3-5 
No. children age 6-12 
No. children age 13-18 
Parent’s age 
Parent’s education 
Married (yes = 1) 




























-0.076*  (0.015) 
-0.302*  (0.078) 
-0.058  (0.053) 
-0.097*  (0.035) 









0.305  (0.226) 
0.158  (0.099) 
-0.003  (0.038) 
-0.035  (0.035) 
0.008  (0.031) 
0.030  (0.031) 
0.016  (0.030) 
0.042  (0.030) 
0.017  (0.029) 
0.030  (0.026) 
0.043  (0.025) 
0.032  (0.025) 
0.049* (0.025) 




0.039  (0.030) 
0.019  (0.032) 
1.027  (0.368) 
Value of Tax Relief, 
If Relief > 0 
(2) 
-0.021  (0.021) 
0.179  (0.101) 
0.262* (0.066) 
0.012  (0.048) 
-0.294*  (0.066) 
0.005  (0.007) 
0.032  (0.017) 
-0.225*  (0.084) 





-0.560  (0.436) 


















Notes: The sample size is 3,438  for the take-up probit and 764 for the value of tax relief regression. 
Parental care is the omitted category for primary arrangement. Numbers in parentheses are stan- 
dard errors. 
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constant but has a full set of income variables because no families in the first 
two income groups receive tax relief. Conditional on other family characteris- 
tics, the income coefficients for the different income variables  are typically 
around 0.44 and do not vary much by income. These coefficients suggest that 
the elasticity of  tax benefits with respect to income is around 0.44, which is 
substantially less than 1. Again, this finding is consistent with the benefits of 
tax relief being progressively distributed on average. 
4.5  Potential Income as a Measure of Ability to Pay 
The results  in section 4.4 indicate that the tax relief received  by a family 
depends on its labor market and child care choices. In this section, we reexam- 
ine the vertical equity of tax relief using potential income (a measure of labor 
market opportunities) as a measure of  ability to pay.  We calculate potential 
labor income by arbitrarily multiplying each parent’s hourly wage rate by 2,600 
hours per year (50 hours per week for 52 weeks).30 For parents without wage 
data (either because wage information is missing or a parent does not work in 
the market), we impute a market wage by estimating a wage equation using 
individual  characteristic^.^' We do not include capital income in our measure 
of potential income for two reasons. First, to some degree differences in capital 
income  arise from differences  in households’  preferences for the timing  of 
consumption.  Since we want to focus on differences in abilities rather  than 
preferences, the concept of potential income should exclude capital income. 
Second, the NCCS data on capital income is sketchy, so any attempt to include 
capital income would be imprecise. 
We focus on married families to stress the differences between single-earner 
and two-earner families (or families with one full-time worker and one part- 
time worker). Using potential  income has two  effects  on the  distributional 
analysis. First, the ranking of households by potential income differs from the 
ranking by reported income. Second, for the ESRs, it changes the denominator. 
Since the choice of the maximum number of hours in a year is arbitrary, the 
scaling of potential income is arbitrary. Therefore, we focus on quartiles of the 
income distribution rather than absolute income levels.’* 
Figure 4.1 compares the take-up rates for married families using actual (re- 
ported) and potential income as the ability-to-pay criterion. The take-up rates 
30. Since we give each worker the same number of hours, the choice of 2,600 hours per year 
only introduces an issue of the scale of potential income. 
3  1. In estimating wage equations for mothers, we include data on age, work experience, educa- 
tion, race, county of  residence, and squared-values of age, work experience, and education. We 
correct for biases created by  labor force participation by  using the two-stage technique outlined 
by  Kiilingsworth (1983, 148-153).  We  estimate similar wage equations for fathers, except we do 
not have data on experience. In cases where the actual wage is missing and the predicted wage is 
negative, we assign the parent a predicted wage of zero. 
32. We  approximate the quartiles of reported income for married households as $0-$25.000 
(24.6  percent),  $25.000-$35,000  (25.0  percent),  $35,000-$50.000  (27.4 percent),  and  above 












15  I  I  I  I 
1  2  3  4 
A bility-to-Pay Quartile 
Reported Income  o  Potential Income 
Fig. 4.1  Take-up rates by ability-to-pay criteria 
for actual income correspond to those in column (6) of  table 4.3. For  both 
measures of ability to pay, the take-up rate increases monotonically with ability 
to pay. However, the difference in take-up rates between the top and bottom 
quartiles is smaller when ability 'to pay is measured by potential income rather 
than reported income. This difference suggests that part of the pattern of take- 
up rates in the reported  income distribution may come from child care ex- 
penses being a cost of having two incomes, which is positively correlated with 
having a higher reported income. 
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Fig. 4.2  ESRs by ability-to-pay criteria 
measures. Since potential income is about two-thirds larger than reported in- 
come, the average ESR is about 30 percent lower. When households are ranked 
by reported income and the subsidy rate is defined using the midpoint of the 
reported income range, tax relief is regressive at low income levels (the ESR 
rises with income) but is progressive above the lowest income quartile. Using 
potential income to measure ability to pay leads to a different conclusion: the 
ESR falls throughout the distribution of  potential income. Furthermore, the 
percentage  difference  in the ESR between  the  top  and bottom  quartiles  is 123  Tax Treatment of  Child Care 
higher when potential income is the measure of  ability to pay. Both of these 
differences imply that tax relief is more progressive among married families 
that receive some relief when the measure of ability to pay is potential, rather 
than reported, income.33  We  interpret this difference as indicating that labor 
supply decisions are an integral part of how tax relief for child care is dis- 
tributed. 
4.6  Behavioral Effects of Tax Relief for Child Care 
By  reducing the after-tax price of  child care, tax relief for child care can 
affect the labor market and child care decisions of households. These behav- 
ioral effects may be the unintended consequences of  tax policy or they may 
serve certain government policy objectives. As  discussed earlier, one of  the 
government’s goals in providing tax relief for child care might be to encourage 
work effort by low-income households. Alternatively, one of the government’s 
goals might be to encourage the purchase of higher-priced, presumably higher- 
quality, care. Tax relief that is tied to labor force participation and the use of 
market care (as are the CCTC and the DCAP) has the potential to achieve both 
these goals. 
Tax relief reduces the marginal cost of care and, thus, raises the net of child 
care wage. For example, of those households paying for care, families with an 
employed mother spend on average $1.56 per hour of  care (Hofferth et al. 
1991, 133).34  Nearly 64 percent of employed mothers pay less than $1.50 per 
hour, whereas only 2 percent pay $5.00 or more per hour (Hofferth et al. 1991, 
133). On the other hand, employed mothers of preschool-age children earn a 
median wage of  $8.17 per hour, while 25 percent of employed mothers earn 
less than $5.50 per hour, and 75 percent earn less than $12.50 per  Thus, 
for a mother earning the median wage, paying the average hourly child care 
cost and facing a marginal tax rate on labor income of  25 percent from the 
combined state and federal income and payroll taxes, a 30 percent tax credit 
raises the after-tax net of  child care wage approximately 10  The 
question for tax policy is whether the tax relief programs are likely to induce 
significant changes in family labor market and child care decisions. To  the 
extent that tax relief induces significant changes in household behavior, these 
33. Examining the unconditional ESRs (the product of the take-up rates and the conditional 
mean ESRs) confirms the result that tax relief is more progressive when ability to pay is measured 
by potential income. For reported income, the distribution of the unconditional ESR is 0.22 (bot- 
tom quartile), 0.34.0.35, and 0.31. For potential income, this pattern is 0.19,0.25,0.25, and 0.18. 
However, even with potential income as the measure of ability to pay, the unconditional mean of 
the ESRs suggests some regressivity at low ability-to-pay levels. 
34. This figure represents expenditures for the primary arrangement of the youngest child under 
age 5. 
35. These figures are based on the authors’ calculations using the full sample from the NCCS. 
36.  This  percentage  increase  in  the  wage  is  calculated  as  (0.30)($1.56)/[(1 -  0.25) 
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behavioral responses will have implications for the distributional effects of any 
changes in the tax treatment of child care. 
The literature on the behavioral effects of child care subsidies has been fairly 
limited until recently. The pioneering study in this field is by Heckman (1974). 
Heckman’s research, which relies on an indirect measure of  child care costs, 
provides the first evidence of  a potentially large effect of  child care costs on 
mothers’ labor force participation. However, it was not until a study by  Blau 
and Robins (1988) that direct evidence was found that child care costs have a 
significant effect on married women’s labor supply as well as the demand for 
market care. Using data from the 1980 baseline household survey of  the Em- 
ployment  Opportunity Pilot Projects (EOPP), Blau  and  Robins estimate a 
model of family labor supply incorporating both market and nonmarket care. 
They estimate the price elasticity of  employment to be -0.38  and the price 
elasticity of market care to be -0.34. 
Using data from the 1984 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Par- 
ticipation (SIPP), more recent studies by Connelly (1992), Ribar (1992), and 
Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel (1992) confirm the results of Blau and 
Robins. The results of all of these studies are summarized in table 4.5.  Con- 
nelly examines the effect of child care costs on married women’s labor force 
participation and finds the participation rate to be sensitive to the average cost 
of child care. In particular, she estimates the price elasticity of employment to 
be -0.20.  Connelly does not examine the decision to purchase market care. 
Ribar analyzes the demand for market and nonmarket care as well as the 
decision of married women to enter the labor market. He too finds that hourly 
child care costs have a negative effect on the labor force participation rate of 
married women and on their decision to purchase market care. However, Ribar 
estimates elasticities considerably larger than those in previous studies. In par- 
ticular, he estimates the price elasticity of  employment to be  -0.74  and the 
price elasticity of  market care to be  -1.86.  Ribar suggests that the smaller 
elasticities found in the previous studies are the result of  using expenditures 
per week or per hour of  work rather than expenditures per hour of  care per 
child. Thus, he asserts the previous studies captured combinations of cost and 
utilization effects. 
Finally, Michalopoulos et al. estimate a structural model in which the deci- 
sion to purchase market care is made simultaneously with the mother’s deci- 
sion to participate in the labor force.37  Michalopoulos et al. find price effects 
on women’s labor supply considerably smaller and price effects on child care 
expenditures greater than the effects estimated by  other researchers. However, 
it should be noted that, in contrast to the other studies reported here, Michalo- 
poulos et al. calculate elasticities for mothers who already work and purchase 
care rather than for the full sample of  women. Michalopoulos et al. estimate 
37. Ribar (1992) employed a partially structural approach in which a reduced-form labor supply 
equation and structural child care demand equations are estimated. Table  4.5  Behavioral Effects of Tax  Relief for Child Care 
Study  Data 
Estimated Elasticity of 
Employment  Estimated Elasticity of  Market Care 
Blau and Robins (1988)  -0.38 
Connelly (  1992)  1984 Panel of  the SIPP  -0.20 
Ribar (  1992)  1984 Panel of  the SIPP  -0.74 
Michalopoulos et al. ( 1992)d 
1980 Baseline household survey of the EOPP 




* In contrast to the other studies, the Michalopoulos et al. results are for mothers who already work and purchase child care 
Estimated elasticity of hours worked with respect to child care subsidy rate. 
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the elasticity of hours worked with respect to the child care subsidy rate to be 
0.0018 and the elasticity of child care expenditures to be 0.20. 
Since Michalopoulos et al. employ a structural model to estimate the em- 
ployment decision of the mother and the decision to purchase market care, they 
are able to estimate directly the effect of a change in child care subsidies on 
child care expenditures and mothers’ labor supply. In particular, the structural 
estimates are used to simulate the effects of proposed changes to the child care 
tax credit. Since nonrefundability has been criticized as a particularly regres- 
sive feature of the CCTC, Michalopoulos et al. simulate the effects of making 
the CCTC refundable. In addition, they simulate the effects of making the de- 
clining subsidy rate (a progressive feature of the CCTC) more progressi~e.~~ 
They find the behavioral response to the refundable credit to be small, while 
the effects of  the more progressive credit are more pronounced. In addition, 
most of the behavioral response is an increase in child care expenditures rather 
than an increase in labor supply. For example, among married mothers there is 
a 2 1.1 percent increase in hours worked and a 508 percent increase in child 
care  expenditure^.^^ 
Henderson  (1989) points  out  that  if  the  labor  market  effects  are  large 
enough, tax relief for child care could pay for itself through the higher labor 
income taxes collected on the additional labor supply. This argument depends 
on the size of the labor market response, the magnitude of the subsidy, and the 
marginal tax rates on labor income. Using labor supply estimates from Blau 
and Robins (1988), Henderson calculates that by eliminating the CCTC, the 
government’s revenue gain would be less than half the static estimate of the tax 
expenditure because families would reduce their labor supply and pay less in 
income and payroll taxes. 
4.7  Conclusion 
The tax treatment of child care expenditures is a complex area of tax policy. 
The debate over how to design these policies addresses issues of horizontal and 
vertical equity as well as questions of efficiency. We examine the distributional 
effects of the tax treatment for child care within this framework. 
By evaluating the progressivity of tax relief, we address concerns regarding 
the vertical equity of tax relief. Using reported income as the measure of ability 
to pay, our results support both the critics of child care tax relief and previous 
research that finds the child care tax credit to be progressive: among a sample 
of families with children, tax relief is regressive through the lowest quintile of 
38. In particular, Robins has proposed a refundable credit with a credit rate of 80 percent for 
families with incomes below $10,000. He has proposed gradually reducing the rate to 20 percent 
for families with incomes of $40,000 and phasing it out entirely for families with incomes ex- 
ceeding $60,000. 
39. The behavioral response is even more pronounced for single mothers. 127  Tax Treatment of Child Care 
the income distribution but progressive throughout the remainder of the in- 
come distribution. The regressivity at low income levels is primarily driven by 
nonrefundability of the credit, while the progressivity is driven by a combina- 
tion of program features, including the declining credit rate and limits on quali- 
fied expenses, and the income inelasticity of child care expenses. When poten- 
tial income is used as the measure of ability to pay, the benefits of tax relief 
appear progressive throughout the income distribution. This difference in con- 
clusions from using the different ability-to-pay standards emphasizes the im- 
portance of defining which families are similar for interpreting equity issues. 
To address some of the concerns regarding the horizontal equity of tax relief, 
we examine the distribution of benefits across family characteristics. We find 
single-parent families are more likely to receive tax relief and, conditional on 
income, receive larger amounts of tax relief. In addition, among families with 
at least one child under age 13, the probability of using the CCTC or a depen- 
dent care assistance plan decreases with the number of children. However, con- 
ditional on receiving tax relief, the value of tax relief increases with the number 
of children under age 13, and this increase depends on the age of the child. As 
one might expect, families with preschool-age children receive larger benefits 
than families with school-age children. Finally, larger tax relief benefits accrue 
to families who use child care centers or family day care homes as the primary 
arrangement for their youngest child than to families who use other modes 
of care. 
Clearly, differences in family labor market and child care decisions are im- 
portant in determining the distribution of benefits from the current tax policy. 
Econometric studies of women’s labor supply and child care decisions suggest 
that tax policy can have substantial behavioral effects. These behavioral re- 
sponses will have implications for the distributional effects of any changes in 
the tax treatment of child care. 
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Comment  Brigitte C.  Madrian 
In this paper, Gentry and Hagy examine the effective tax subsidies that result 
from two mechanisms designed to provide tax relief for child care expendi- 
tures: the child care tax credit and dependent care assistance plans. The paper 
pursues two courses of inquiry: (1) calculating the distribution of the tax sub- 
sidy and (2) examining the determinants of tax relief. Several interesting find- 
ings emerge from the analysis. First, the distribution of the tax subsidy when 
calculated on the basis of reported income suggests that child care tax relief is 
regressive in the lower tail of the income distribution. When it is calculated on 
the basis of potential income, however, the tax subsidy is progressive through- 
out the income distribution. Second, single-parent families profit more from 
these tax subsidies than do two-parent families: they are more likely to claim 
tax relief and, conditional on income, receive larger benefits. Finally, families 
Brigitte C. Madrian is assistant professor of  economics at the University of Chicago Graduate 
School of Business and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 129  Tax Treatment of Child Care 
with more children are less likely to receive tax relief, but conditional on re- 
ceiving tax relief, benefits increase with family size. 
This paper presents a careful and comprehensive analysis of how tax relief 
for child care expenditures is currently distributed. In my remarks, I would like 
to extend the discussion about the progressivity or regressivity of  these tax 
subsidies to alternative scenarios that could affect the actual distribution of 
benefits. First, I will consider how potential tax benefits are related to the prog- 
ressivity of child care subsidies. Then I will discuss the progressivity implica- 
tions of  a child care tax subsidy designed in response to the equity and effi- 
ciency arguments that call for having tax relief for child care expenditures. 
Current Tax Relief for Child Care Expenditures 
Gentry and Hagy begin where any paper on tax policy should begin: by 
describing the tax rules pertinent to the discussion. The government currently 
provides such tax relief through two different means-the  child care tax credit 
(CCTC) and dependent care assistance plan (DCAPs). As discussed in the pa- 
per, there are many common features to these two tax relief programs: qualify- 
ing expenditures must be on behalf of  children under age 13, expenses must 
be work related, parent(s) must be working or enrolled in school, and eligible 
expenditures are limited by earned income. 
There are other features that distinguish these two programs. Like other tax 
credits, the CCTC can be claimed by  anyone with qualifying expenditures 
simply by attaching the appropriate form to the personal income tax return. In 
contrast, DCAPs are an employee benefit, like health insurance and pensions, 
and eligibility to participate is thus limited to those whose employers provide 
this benefit. The maximum level of  expenditures eligible under a DCAP is 
constant for all individuals, while the level of  eligible expenses under the 
CCTC is higher for families claiming expenditures for two or more children 
than for families with only one eligible child. Like other tax credits, the CCTC 
reduces an individual’s tax liability directly. In contrast to the earned income 
tax credit, however, the CCTC is nonrefundable. The extent of  the CCTC is 
thus limited by  an  individual’s pre-CCTC tax liability. By  comparison, the 
DCAP provides tax relief indirectly by  reducing an individual’s taxable in- 
come. The value of the CCTC is determined by  a statutory subsidy rate that 
declines with income over a certain range. The value of a DCAP, in contrast, 
increases with an individual’s marginal tax rate. 
Although the main focus of  Gentry and Hagy’s  paper is to calculate the 
distribution of the tax subsidy associated with the CCTC and DCAPs, it never 
shows exactly what the potential tax  savings associated with these two pro- 
grams are and how they compare. To illustrate the differences in the tax savings 
associated with the CCTC and a DCAP, figures 4C.1 through 4C.3 plot the tax 
relief available through the CCTC and a DCAP for a married couple filing 
jointly, assuming that all income is labor income (the value of  the earned 
income tax credit is ignored in these figures). Figure 4C.1 assumes that the 130  William M. Gentry and Alison P. Hagy 
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couple has $200 per month in expenses for one child, figure 4C.2 assumes 
$400 per month in expenses for one child, and figure 4C.3 assumes $400 per 
month in expenses for two children. These graphs highlight some of the differ- 
ences between  the two programs.  Note that neither program offers any tax 
relief to low-income families who have no tax liability initially. As can be seen 
in all three graphs, the tax savings offered by DCAPs increases with income 
as marginal tax rates increase. In contrast, the tax savings associated with the 
CCTC is either falling or constant as income increases, except for a very nar- 
row income range over which the value of the CCTC increases. 
In figure 4C. 1,  for a family with one child and $200 per month in child care 
expenditures,  the maximum tax  savings offered  by  both  a DCAP and  the 
CCTC is abour $750 annually.’ For middle-income families the CCTC pro- 
vides greater tax relief, while at higher levels of  income a DCAP provides 
greater tax relief. Thus, which program is “better” at reducing tax liability de- 
pends on the level of family income. If monthly expenditures rise to $400 per 
month (fig. 4C.2), however, the picture changes dramatically. While the tax 
savings derived from the CCTC remains the same, the tax savings of the DCAP 
increases, reaching a maximum of about $1,500 per month. Moreover, at this 
higher level of child care expenditures, a DCAP provides greater tax savings 
1. Note that in all three figures, the value of a DCAP may be somewhat less than the actual tax 
savings graphed, to the extent that the “use it or lose it” feature of a DCAP creates uncertainty. 132  William M. Gentry and Alison P.  Hagy 
than the CCTC throughout  the income distribution. With two children  and 
$400 per month in child care expenditures (fig. 4C.3), the picture changes once 
again. In this case, the value of a DCAP is the same as it was in figure 4C.2, 
while the maximum tax  savings provided by  the CCTC increases  to about 
$1,500.  As in figure 4C. 1, the CCTC is more valuable than a DCAP for middle- 
income families, while the reverse is true for high-income families. 
These figures suggest that the resulting distribution of the tax subsidy pro- 
vided by these two programs will depend on a number of factors, such as the 
extent to which DCAPs are provided by employers, especially for high-income 
families; the number of children that each family has placed in child care; how 
much families at various points in the income distribution spend on child care; 
and the actual distribution of family income. The actual distribution of the tax 
subsidy as calculated by Gentry and Hagy may therefore be expected to change 
as these factors which translate the potential tax savings into actual tax savings 
also change. Increased availability of DCAPs will tend to make the tax subsidy 
more regressive, especially if families have only one rather than two or more 
children in child care. Similarly, if  the distribution  of  income shifts so that 
more families have sufficiently low income that they receive no tax savings 
from either program, the distribution of the tax subsidy will appear more re- 
gressive. In contrast, the tax subsidy will become more progressive as utiliza- 
tion of  the CCTC increases, either because more families have sufficient in- 
come that  they have positive tax liability  in the absence  of  any child care 
expenses or because DCAPs are not available or offer less tax savings than 
the CCTC. 
Designing Tax Relief for Child Care 
After reviewing the nature of both the CCTC and DCAPs, Gentry and Hagy 
consider the various equity and efficiency rationales for providing tax relief 
for child care. I would like to pick up where they leave off and consider how 
these rationales for the provision of tax relief inform the discussion about the 
appropriate design of such tax relief and what they imply about the distribution 
of tax relief. I should first note that if all child care expenditures are considered 
a consumption expense, merely one more of the many costs associated with 
having children, then there is no rationale for tax relief. If, however, we believe 
that child care is more than just a consumption expense, there are a number of 
issues to be considered in designing tax relief for child care. Should tax relief 
be provided through a credit, such as the CCTC, or a deduction, such as a 
DCAP? If through a credit, should the credit be refundable? Should tax relief 
be unlimited, or capped (as are both the CCTC and DCAPs)? If capped, on 
what factors should the cap depend? Number of  children? Age of  children? 
Should expenditures on all forms of child care be eligible for tax relief? 
One commonly cited rationale for tax relief is that child care expenditures 
represent a cost of doing business, and this cost should be deducted from tax- 
able income just as other costs of business can be (or should be) deducted from 
taxable income. This justification for tax relief suggests that relief should come 133  Tax Treatment of Child Care 
in the form of a deduction from taxable income rather than as a tax credit. It 
should be noted that many other so-called costs of doing business are not cur- 
rently deductible from taxable income: travel costs for getting to and from 
work are not deductible, regular meals are not deductible, clothing costs (other 
than for uniforms) are not deductible, and other miscellaneous expenses are 
only deductible for those who itemize to the extent that they exceed 2 percent 
of adjusted gross income (unless an individual is self-employed). 
One reason that many of these other work-related expenses are not deduct- 
ible is that to some extent, they represent personal consumption: transportation 
costs are related to personal decisions regarding where to live and how to get 
to work; the costs of clothing and meals are likely to reflect personal tastes. 
Even if child care expenditures do represent a cost of doing business, they are 
likely to reflect some degree of consumption as well: child care providers fur- 
nish meals, diapers, and toys in addition to supervision. In addition, many 
forms of  child care also come with large “educational” or “entertainment” 
components that certainly represent parental consumption decisions. The de- 
gree of consumption associated with child care is likely to be reflected in the 
price of child care, as the cost of better-trained providers and expensive outings 
is passed on to the parents who purchase these types of  care. There are two 
ways that one could account for these consumption expenditures in the design 
of tax relief. One would be to make expenditures only partially deductible. A 
second, and perhaps more appropriate, way  would be to limit the extent to 
which child care expenses are deductible to the expenditure level that buys 
basic supervision without the frills.2 Note that both the CCTC and DCAPs 
have such limits. 
Because there are additional costs incurred from placing additional children 
in child care, any limit on expenditures should be related to the number of 
children (the CCTC currently provides a double credit for two- relative to one- 
child families; DCAPs do not depend on the number of ~hildren).~  And be- 
cause older children are in school most of the day, a limit in excess of the cost 
of after-school supervision will result in subsidies for consumption activities. 
Thus expenditure limits should also vary with the age of children. 
A second rationale for providing tax relief for child care expenditures is that, 
empirically, women with small children have higher labor supply elasticities 
than  either men  or  women  without  children. On  efficiency grounds, these 
women should face lower marginal tax rates. Tax subsidies for child care repre- 
sent a way to effectively lower the cost of  working for those individuals who 
are likely to have the most elastic labor su~ply.~  This rationale for tax relief 
2. There may  be a separate rationale for wanting to subsidize educational expenditures on 
young children. 
3. If there are economies of scale in child supervision, then the increase in the limit on allowable 
expenditures should decline with each additional child. 
4.  An alternative way to do this is through a secondary earner deduction (Feldstein and Feen- 
berg, chap. 2 in this volume). Note that tax relief for child care expenditures may actually be more 
efficient than a secondary earner deduction if having a high labor supply elasticity results more 
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does not speak so clearly to the issue of  whether relief  should be provided 
through a credit or a deduction. That labor supply elasticities tend to increase 
with income, however, suggests that a deduction may be favored on efficiency 
grounds as well. Because participation elasticities are greater than hours elas- 
ticities, efficiency arguments also favor a limit on the level of tax relief. If labor 
supply elasticities decrease with the number of children, efficiency arguments 
call for a limit that increases with the number of children as well. 
Overall, then, the equity and efficiency arguments in favor of tax relief sug- 
gest that child care expenditures  should be  deductible  from income. There 
should, however, be a limit on the level of expenditures that are deductible, 
although this limit should vary with both the age and the number of the chil- 
dren in child care. While most of  these features are reflected  in either the 
CCTC or a DCAP, neither program combines them all. Under a DCAP, ex- 
penses are deductible from taxable income up to a certain limit, but there are 
no adjustments for the age or number of children. DCAPs also have the bizarre 
“use it or lose it” feature, for which I am hard pressed to find any rationale, 
and they are only available for a small subset of the population. The CCTC, on 
the other hand, is available to all but is a credit rather than a deduction. I can 
think of no justification for having either or both of the two different types of 
tax relief currently available. 
What are the distributional implications of an “ideally” designed type of tax 
relief? In a progressive tax system, tax deductions are more regressive than tax 
credits. Thus, a move away from the CCTC, the form of tax relief that is used 
predominantly now, and toward something with the deductibility features of a 
DCAP will make the distribution of tax relief for child care more regressive 
than it currently is. A limit on the level of deductible expenditures, however, 
will make the distribution of tax relief progressive over the income ranges in 
which the expense limits are likely to bind, and a lower expenditure limit will 
impart greater progressivity. As shown in table 4.2  of the Gentry and Hagy 
paper, the expense limit binds for only about 35 percent of families with in- 
comes greater than $100,000. This suggests that there may be considerable 
scope to make the distribution of tax relief more progressive by lowering the 
level of  deductible  expenditures  without compromising  the equity  and effi- 
ciency arguments that call for relief in the first place. 